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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new biometric verification and template protection system which we call THRIVE. The
system includes novel enrollment and authentication protocols based on threshold homomorphic encryption where
a private key is shared between a user and a verifier. In the THRIVE system, only encrypted binary biometric templates
are stored in a database and verification is performed via homomorphically randomized templates, thus, original
templates are never revealed during authentication. Due to the underlying threshold homomorphic encryption
scheme, a malicious database owner cannot perform full decryption on encrypted templates of the users in the
database. In addition, security of the THRIVE system is enhanced using a two-factor authentication scheme involving
user’s private key and biometric data. Using simulation-based techniques, the proposed system is proven secure in
the malicious model. The proposed system is suitable for applications where the user does not want to reveal her
biometrics to the verifier in plain form, but needs to prove her identity by using biometrics. The system can be used
with any biometric modality where a feature extraction method yields a fixed size binary template and a query
template is verified when its Hamming distance to the database template is less than a threshold. The overall
connection time for the proposed THRIVE system is estimated to be 336 ms on average for 256-bit biometric
templates on a desktop PC running with quad core 3.2 GHz CPUs at 10 Mbit/s up/down link connection speed.
Consequently, the proposed system can be efficiently used in real-life applications.
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1 Introduction
In recent times, public and commercial organiza-
tions invest on secure electronic authentication (e-
authentication) systems to reliably verify identity of
individuals. Biometrics is one of the rapidly emerging
technologies for e-authentication systems [1]. However,
it is almost impossible to discuss biometrics without
addressing the associated security and privacy concerns
[2, 3]. Biometric data, stored either in a smart card or in
a central database, incurs security and privacy risks due
to increased number of attacks against identity manage-
ment systems in recent years [2–5]. Security and privacy
concerns on biometrics limit their widespread usage in
real-life applications.
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Biometric systems, which use error correction methods
are proposed to cope with the noisy nature of the bio-
metric templates in the literature [6–8]. These systems
can obtain error-free biometric templates by using error
correction techniques and thus cryptographic primitives
(e.g., encryption or cryptographic hash) can successfully
be employed free of the aforementioned avalanche effect
[8–11]. However, their high error correcting capability
requirements may render them impractical for real-life
applications [12]. Furthermore, side information (e.g., par-
ity bits) is needed for error correction and this may lead
to information leakage (i.e., some attacks like error cor-
recting code statistics, and non-randomness attacks) [13].
Zhou et al. successfully demonstrate that redundancy in
an error correction code causes privacy leakage for bio-
metric systems [14, 15].
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Although biometric template protection methods are
proposed to overcome security and privacy issues
[3, 16–29], recent research shows that security issues
remain to be of a major concern [30–36]. In addition to
this, there are a number of studies pointing out the pri-
vacy leakage of biometric applications [37, 38] as well as
biometric template protection methods [14, 15, 39]. In
the literature, Zhou et al. propose a framework for secu-
rity and privacy assessment of the biometric template
protection methods [14]. Also, Ignatenko et al. analyze
the privacy leakage in terms of the mutual information
between the public helper data and biometric features
in a biometric template protection method. A trade-off
between maximum secret key rate and privacy leakage is
given in the works of Ignatenko et al. [38, 40].
Recently, homomorphic encryption methods are used
with biometric feature extractionmethods to perform ver-
ification via encrypted biometric templates [20, 41–43].
However, these methods offer solutions only in the semi-
honest model where each party is obliged to follow
the protocol but can arbitrarily analyze the knowledge
that it learns during the execution of the protocol to
obtain some additional information. The existing sys-
tems have not been designed for the malicious model
where each party can arbitrarily deviate from the pro-
tocol and may be corrupted. They also do not take
into account security and privacy issues of biometric
templates stored in the database [20, 43]. The authors
state that their security model will be improved in the
future work by applying encryption methods also on
the biometric templates stored in the database. More-
over, some of these systems are exclusively designed
for a single biometric modality or a specific feature
extraction method which also limits their application
areas [41, 42]. In addition, an adversary can enroll
herself on behalf of any user to their systems since
they offer no protection against malicious enrollment.
Finally, all of these systems suffer from computational
complexity.
Biohashing schemes, one of the emerging biometric
template protection methods [25–29], offer low error
rates and fast verification at the authentication stage.
However, they are vulnerable to attacks as reported
in the literature [33–36]. These schemes should be
improved to be safely adapted in a wide range of real-
life applications. In this study, we present new enroll-
ment and authentication protocols to increase the security
and the privacy of the biometric verification. The pro-
posed THRIVE system can work with any biometric
feature extraction scheme whose templates are binary
or can be binarized (e.g., by using thresholded ran-
dom projection schemes) and where the verification
decision can be based on Hamming distances between
templates.
1.1 Problem definition
A simplified view of biometric authentication systems can
be described as in Fig. 1. A user claims an identity and
provides a biometric which is compared with existing
biometric templates stored in a database and if the new
biometric matches the one in the database, the user is ver-
ified to be a genuine user of the system. The database
biometric templates are obtained during a separate enroll-
ment session. There are security and privacy concerns
related to different parts of this system as can be seen in
Fig. 1. One of the main concerns is the protection of pri-
vacy in storage of database biometric templates to make
sure that even if the templates are obtained by an adver-
sary, they should not reveal any private information about
the users of the system. Other concerns are eavesdropping
or tampering with the communication channel between
the user and the verifier or overriding the response of the
system by adversaries.
A direct solution to biometric template protection
might be to store biometric templates on the server side
in plain form, and, in this way, it may seem to be possi-
ble to realize biometric authentication by simply utilizing
well-known authentication protocols like SSL/TLS. How-
ever, as far as security and privacy are concerned, one
of the major security issues in this scenario is that any
malicious behavior on server side can be very harmful
because of storage of biometric data in clear. Further-
more, these standard authentication protocols use con-
ventional cryptographic primitives like Hash, RSA, and
AES that cannot be directly used since encryptions can-
not be decrypted by the server alone and also biometric
data are inherently noisy [9]. More precisely, when a mali-
cious database manager obtains decryption keys, she can
perform decryption alone and can access biometric tem-
plates of all users. Therefore, biometric templates should
be encrypted during the enrollment phase where the pri-
vate key and encryption are never given to the server
and authentication should be still guaranteed. Namely,
when a biometric template is encrypted during the enroll-
ment stage, only an approximate comparison between the
stored and measured biometric data should be decrypted
during the authentication stage. With the conventional
cryptographic mechanisms, however, this again can lead
to security and privacy issues for biometric templates at
the authentication stage [9].
1.2 Our contributions
In this paper, we address adversary attacks in case of an
active attacker who wants to gain unauthorized access
to the system in the malicious attack model, where dis-
honest parties can deviate from the protocol and behave
arbitrarily. By taking possible attacks into consideration,
we propose a new biometric authentication system based
on threshold homomorphic encryption. Our aim is to
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Fig. 1 Problem definition. A schematic description of a biometric authentication system and problems associated with various attacks
enhance the security of the system and preserve pri-
vacy of the users. The contributions of this work can be
summarized as follows:
• A new biometric authentication system (which we
call THRIVE) is proposed in the malicious model. It
is a two-factor authentication system (biometric and
secret key) and can be used in the applications where
the user and the verifier do not trust each other.
• THRIVE system can be used with any existing
biometric modality whose templates can be
transformed into a binary vector and decision can be
based on Hamming distances between binary
templates.
• Even if an adversary gains access to the database and
gathers encrypted biometric templates, she can
neither authenticate herself by using these templates
nor decrypt them due to the (2, 2)-threshold
homomorphic encryption scheme.
• Biometric templates are never released even during
the authentication phase and only the encrypted
binary templates are stored in the database.
• The THRIVE system offers a new and advanced
biometric template protection method without any
helper data.
• The THRIVE system ensures security of the
communication channel between the user and the
verifier since all exchanged messages are randomized
and/or encrypted. In addition, usage of nonces1 and
signature schemes guarantees uniqueness of the
communication session.
• Since the biometric templates are encrypted, they are
irreversible by definition as long as decryption keys,
which are shared secrets, are not stolen.
• The THRIVE system can generate a number of
protected templates from the same biometric data of
a user because of randomized encryption. Thus, it
ensures diversity. Besides, they are also cancelable,
i.e., when they are stolen, they can be reproduced.
• The proposed authentication protocol run requires
336 ms and 671 ms on average for 256-bit and 512-bit
biohash vectors, respectively, on a desktop PC with
quad-core 3.2 GHz CPUs at 10 Mbit/s up/down link
connection speed. Therefore, the THRIVE system is
sufficiently efficient to be used in real-world
applications.
The paper is structured as follows. Related work
is presented in Section 2. Preliminaries are given in
Section 3. The proposed biometric authentication sys-
tem is introduced in Section 4. The security proofs
of the proposed protocols are given in Section 5. The
complexity analysis of the proposed system is discussed
in Section 6. Comprehensive comparison between the
proposed system and the existing systems/methods is
given in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 Related work
In this part, we perform literature review on the works
which are developed for mitigating security and privacy
problems of biometrics and we categorize them as illus-
trated in Fig. 2. Jain et al. classify biometric template pro-
tection schemes into two main categories [3]: 1) Feature
transformation-based schemes, and 2) Biometric cryp-
tosystems. We analyze various studies under these two
groups below.
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Fig. 2 Classification. Classification of biometric template protection methods
2.1 Feature transformation-based schemes
Feature transformation-based schemes use a transforma-
tion which is applied on a biometric template. The basic
idea is to transform features of a biometric template into
another secure domain by using a user defined secret
key or password which determines parameters of the
transformation.
Biohashing schemes are simple yet powerful biomet-
ric template protection methods [25–29] that can be
classified under salting-based schemes. It is worth point-
ing out that biohashing is completely different from
cryptographic hashing. Originally proposed to solve the
aforementioned security and privacy issues, biohashing
schemes fail to be a comprehensive solution. In [33–36],
the authors claim that biohashes can be reversible under
certain conditions and an adversary can estimate the bio-
metric template of a user from her biohash. Consequently,
when biohashes are stored in the databases and/or smart
cards in their plain form, they can threaten the security of
the system as well as the privacy of the users. Moreover,
an adversary can use a compromised biohash to exploit
the system security by performing malicious authentica-
tion. Also, as in the case of a compromised secret key, an
adversary can recover the biometric template since these
schemes are generally invertible [3].
Non-invertible transform-based schemes utilizing one-
way functions have been proposed to protect biometric
templates [44–46] against inversion attacks. A user secret
key, which determines the parameters of non-invertible
transformation function, is provided during the authen-
tication stage. Even if an adversary obtains the secret
key and/or the transformed biometric template, it is
computationally hard to recover the original biometric
template. However, these schemes suffer from the trade-
off between discriminability and non-invertibility which
limits their recognition performance [3].
2.2 Biometric cryptosystems
The main idea behind biometric cryptosystems (also
known as biometric encryption systems) is to use cryp-
tographic techniques to enable template protection. Ear-
lier methods include binding a cryptographic key with a
biometric template or generating the cryptographic key
directly from the biometric template [47]. Recently, there
have been studies which use homomorphic encryption
techniques for secure computation of Hamming dis-
tances. Thus, the biometric cryptosystems can be classi-
fied into three main categories: 1) Key binding schemes,
2) Key generation schemes, and 3) Modern cryptography
for biometrics.
Key binding and generation systems use helper data,
which is public information, about the biometric tem-
plate for verification. Although helper data is supposed
to leak no critical information about the biometric tem-
plate, Rathgeb et al. show that helper data is vulnerable
to statistical attacks [48]. Furthermore, Ignatenko et al.
show how to compute a bound on possible secret rate and
privacy leakage rate for helper data schemes [49]. Adler
conducts a hill-climbing attack against biometric encryp-
tion systems [31]. In addition, Stoianov et al. propose
several attacks (i.e., nearest impostors, error correcting
code statistics, and non-randomness attacks) to biometric
encryption systems [13].
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2.2.1 Key binding systems
In the literature, fuzzy commitment [8] and fuzzy vault
schemes [24] are categorized under the key binding
schemes. These schemes aim to bind a cryptographic key
with a biometric template and it is expected that nei-
ther the biometric template nor the random bit string can
be recovered if the corresponding user’s biometric data
is not known. However, this is not the case in reality as
biometric templates are not uniformly random. Further-
more, error correction codes (ECC) used in biometric
cryptosystems lead to statistical attacks (i.e., running ECC
in a soft decoding or erasure mode and ECC Histogram
attack) [13, 50]. Ignatenko et al. show that fuzzy commit-
ment schemes leak information in cryptographic keys and
biometric templates which lead to security flaws and pri-
vacy concerns [38, 40]. In addition, Zhou et al. argue that
fuzzy commitment schemes leak private data. Chang et al.
describe a non-randomness attack against fuzzy vault
scheme which causes distinction between the minutiae
points and the chaff points [51]. Moreover, Kholmatov
et al. describe a correlation attack against fuzzy vault
schemes [52].
2.2.2 Key generation systems
Keys are generated from helper data and a given biometric
template in key generation schemes [3]. Fuzzy key extrac-
tion schemes are classified under the key generation ones
and they use helper data [53–58]. These schemes can be
used as an authentication mechanism where a user is veri-
fied via her own biometric template as a key. Although the
fuzzy key extraction schemes produce keys from biomet-
ric templates, the repeatability and the randomness of the
generated keys are two major questions [3]. Boyen et al.
describe several vulnerabilities of the fuzzy key extraction
schemes from an attacker perspective [59], e.g., improper
fuzzy sketch constructions leading to information leakage
on the secret, biased codes allowing majority vote attack,
and permutation leaks. Moreover, Li et al. argue that when
an adversary obtains sketches, theymay reveal the identity
of the users [60].
2.2.3 Modern cryptography for biometrics
In recent years, a number of papers have been pub-
lished on systems in which biometrics and homomor-
phic encryption work together for either authentication
or identification purposes. These systems have crypto-
graphic protocols based on secure multiparty computa-
tion and most of them especially use superior properties
of homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g., allow compu-
tation on encrypted data) in order to overcome security
and privacy threats to the biometric data.
Kerschbaum et al. [61] propose a protocol to com-
pare fingerprint templates without actually exchanging
them by using secure multi-party computation in the
semi-honestmodel. At the enrollment stage, the user gives
her fingerprint template, minutiae pairs and a PIN to the
system. Thus, the verifier knows the fingerprint templates
which are collected at the enrollment stage. Although the
user does not send her biometric data at the authentica-
tion, the verifier already has the user’s enrolled biometric
data and this violates the privacy of the user in case of a
malicious (or compromised) verifier. A malicious verifier
can use these fingerprint templates for malicious authen-
tication. Furthermore, since the fingerprint comparison
reveals the matching scores (e.g., Hamming distance [62]),
the attacker can launch a hill climbing attack against this
system.
Erkin et al. [41] propose a privacy preserving face recog-
nition system for the eigen-face recognition algorithm
[63]. They present a protocol that performs operations
on encrypted images by using the Paillier homomorphic
encryption scheme. Later, Sadeghi et al. improve the effi-
ciency of this system [42]. In both studies, the system
is limited to using eigen-face recognition algorithm with
homomorphic encryption when there are better alterna-
tive face recognition algorithms. Moreover, they do not
use a threshold cryptosystem, which prevents a malicious
party from aiming to perform decryption by himself. Stor-
ing face images (or corresponding feature vectors) in the
database in plain form is the most serious security draw-
back of this system. An adversary, who has access to the
database, may obtain all face images.
Barni et al. [20, 43] propose a privacy preservation
system for fingercode templates by using homomorphic
encryption in the semi-honest model where all parties fol-
low the protocol, but dishonest parties may be curious
to violate others’ privacy. Thus, they do not propose any
security and privacy solutions on the biometric templates
stored in the database. This issue is mentioned as a future
work in their paper. In addition, they do not use thresh-
old encryption, which would protect the system against a
malicious party aiming to perform decryption by herself.
Another drawback is that the system does not address the
malicious enrollment issue. Although they achieve better
performance than those in [41, 42] in terms of bandwidth
and time complexity, they do not consider the scenarios
where the user and the verifier do not trust each other (i.e.,
the malicious model).
Kulkarni et al. [64] propose a biometric authentication
system based on somewhat homomorphic encryption
scheme of Boneh et al. [65], which allows an arbitrary
number of addition of ciphertexts, but supports only
one multiplication operation between the ciphertexts.
Although the values stored on the enrollment server are
the XORed values of the biometric template vector with
the corresponding user’s key, the user first extracts and
sends her biometric features to the trusted enrollment
server. Again this system uses a trusted enrollment server
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and fails to provide security and privacy objectives against
a malicious database manager. In addition, the system
is not efficient since 58 s is required for a successful
authentication of a 2048-bit binary feature vector.
There are also some works on secure Hamming distance
calculation by using cryptographic primitives [64, 66–68].
These papers, however, limit the scope of their works
only to secure Hamming distance calculation. They do not
address biometric authentication as a whole and do not
satisfy security and privacy concerns under a malicious
model.
Osadchy et al. [66] propose a secure Hamming dis-
tance calculation scheme based on Pailler homomorphic
encryption for face biometrics. The system is called SCiFI.
Although they claim that SCiFI is computationally effi-
cient, it mostly uses pre-computation techniques. Its pre-
computation time includes processing time that must be
done locally by each user before using the system each
time. They report that SCiFI’s online running time takes
0.31 s for a face vector of size 900 bits; however, its offline
computation time takes 213 s. SCiFI provides security
against only in the semi-honest adversaries.
Rane et al. [67] also propose secure Hamming distance
calculation for biometric applications. Nonetheless, their
proposed method fails to ensure biometric database secu-
rity because biometric templates are stored in plain format
in the database. Thus, a malicious verifier can threaten
a user’s security and privacy. Bringer et al. [68] pro-
pose a secure Hamming distance calculation for biometric
application, called as SHADE. This technique is based
on committed oblivious transfer [69]. However, it can-
not guarantee biometric database security since biometric
templates are stored in plain form in the database.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Threshold homomorphic cryptosystem
In this section, we briefly describe underlying crypto-
graphic primitives of the protocols. Given a public key
encryption scheme, let m ∈ M denote the message or
plaintext space, c ∈ C the ciphertext space, and r ∈ R
its randomness. Let c = Encpk(m; r) depict an encryption
of m under the public key pk where r is a random value.
Let sk be the corresponding private key, which allows
the holder to retrieve a message from a ciphertext. The
decryption procedure is performed with the private key sk
asm = Decsk(c).
In a (t, n)-threshold cryptosystem, the knowledge of a
private key is distributed among parties P1, · · · ,Pn. Then,
at least t of these parties are required for a success-
ful decryption. On the other hand, there is a public key
to perform encryption. More formally, let P1, · · · ,Pn be
the participants. We define a (t, n)-threshold encryption
scheme with three phases as follows:
• In the key generation phase, each participant Pi
receives a pair of (pki, ski), where pki and ski are the
shares of the public and secret key, respectively.
Then, the overall public key pk is constructed by
collaboratively combining the shares. Finally pk is
broadcasted to allow anyone to encrypt messages in
M. The shares of this public key are also broadcasted
to allow all parties to check the correctness of the
decryption process.
• The encryption phase is performed as in any public
key encryption cryptosystem. Ifm ∈ M is the
message, a (secret) random value r fromR is chosen
and c = Encpk(m; r) is computed under a public key
pk.
• In the threshold decryption phase, given that t (or
more) participants agree to decrypt a ciphertext c,
they follow two steps. First, each participant produces
a decryption share by performing Sji = Decskji (c),
j = 1, · · · , t. After broadcasting Sji, they all can apply
a reconstruction function F on these shares so that
they can recover the original message by performing
m = F (S1i , · · · , Sti ) where P1i , · · · ,Pti represent the
group of t participants willing to recover m.
In case of a (t, n)-threshold scheme, the additional
requirement is that if less than t parties gather their cor-
rect shares of the decryption of a given ciphertext, they
will gather no information whatsoever about the plaintext.
In the proposed system, we use the (2, 2)-threshold cryp-
tosystem between the prover (the user) and the verifier
where both players must cooperate to decrypt. In this way,
we ensure that the verifier cannot decrypt the ciphertexts
alone, and the decryption is only performed by both the
user and the verifier during the computation of Hamming
distance of their corresponding inputs.
A public key encryption scheme is said to be addi-
tively homomorphic if given c1 = Enc (m1; r1) and c2 =
Enc (m2; r2) it follows that c1c2 = Enc (m1 + m2; r3)where
m1,m2 ∈ M and r1, r2, r3 ∈ R. That is to say, homo-
morphic encryption is a form of encryption that allows
parties to perform computations on the encrypted val-
ues and match the result of operations performed on the
plaintexts. Namely, they do not possess the decryption
key, and therefore they do not know the plaintexts but can
still perform operations under encryption. Conventional
cryptosystems do not satisfy the homomorphic property.
There are various versions of threshold homomor-
phic cryptosystems. The most widely used are ElGamal
[70] or Paillier [71] cryptosystems. In our proposal, we
will use a threshold version of Goldwasser-Micali (GM)
encryption scheme (i.e., between a user and a verifier)
proposed by Katz and Yung in [72]. GM scheme is
XOR-homomorphic [73], i.e., given any two bits b1, b2
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in {0, 1}, any random values r1, r2 ∈ R , and any
encryptions Enc (b1, r1) , Enc (b2, r2), it is easy to compute
Enc (b1 ⊕ b2, r1r2). Note that our scheme requires encryp-
tion of bits instead of bit-strings, and GM encryption is
more efficient compared to ElGamal or Paillier in the case
of bit encryption.
In the proposed protocol, we use a variant of the
threshold decryption protocol which is the so-called
private threshold decryption [74]. The requirement of
this protocol is that one of the t parties will be the
only party who will recover the secret. All t − 1 other
parties follow the protocol and broadcast their shares
to achieve this requirement. The party who will learn
the plaintext proceeds with the decryption process pri-
vately, collects all decryption shares from the t − 1
other parties, and privately reconstructs the message. The
remaining parties will not get any information about the
message.
3.1.1 Threshold XOR-Homomorphic Goldwasser-Micali
encryption scheme
We next give a brief explanation of (2,2)-GM cryptosys-
tem between two users (in our proposal, between a user
and a verifier) using a Trusted Dealer. We note that one
can also exclude a trusted dealer using the scheme in [72]:
Key generation:
The trusted dealer first chooses prime numbers p
and q (‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = n) such that N = pq and p ≡ q





such that p1 ≡ q1 ≡ 0 mod 4 and
p2 ≡ q2 ≡ 0 mod 4. He sets p0 = p − p1 − p2 and
q0 = q − q1 − q2 and sends (p1, q1) to the first party
and (p2, q2) to the second party. He finally
broadcasts (p0, q0,N).
Encryption of a bit b ∈ {0, 1}:
Choose r ∈R ZN and compute a ciphertext
C = (−1)br2 mod N .
Decryption:






J = 1 then all parties stop because either the
encryption algorithm was not run honestly or the





































= −1)). If J = 1
then the first party broadcasts b1 = C(−p1−q1)/4
mod N . The second party (who is going to decrypt)
will privately compute b0 = C(N−p0−q0+1)/4 mod N
and b2 = C(−p2−q2)/4 mod N . Finally, the decrypted
bit b is computed as b = (1 − b0b1b2 mod N) /2.
Note that it is easy to see whether C is a quadratic
residue by computing b ≡ C(N−p−q−+1)/4 mod N. The
reason is briefly as follows. We first note that by Euler’s
theorem Cφ(N) ≡ 1 mod N where φ(N) = (p−1)(q−1).
We also know that C is quadratic residue if and only if












































= 1 (resp. −1) then Cp−1/2 ≡ 1 mod p
(resp. −1 mod p) and Cq−1/2 ≡ 1 mod q (resp. −1
mod q). Hence, for both cases C(p−1)(q−1)/4 ≡ 1 mod p
and C(p−1)(q−1)/4 ≡ 1 mod q. By the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, we have C(p−1)(q−1)/4 ≡ 1 mod N . Hence, C
is quadratic residue if and only if b = 1.
3.2 Biometric verification scheme
Biometric verification schemes perform an automatic ver-
ification of a user based on her specific biometric data.
They have two main stages: 1) Enrollment stage, and
2) Authentication stage. The user gives her biometric
data to the system at the enrollment stage. Then in the
authentication stage, she provides her biometric data to
the system to prove her identity. Any biometric scheme,
which provides binary templates or whose templates can
be binarized, can be used with the proposed threshold
homomorphic cryptosystem. Most biometric templates
are represented as fixed length real vectors and they can
be binarized easily using locality sensitive hashing (LSH)
techniques and the most natural and widely used distance
in the hash space is the Hamming distance. Previous stud-
ies have shown that coming up with distance preserving
binary hashing is possible [75–77]. So, we believe the sys-
temwe propose can be used in a broad class of verification
systems with minor modification in the system to bina-
rize the templates and use Hamming distance for distance
calculation, which will result in minimal loss of security
properties in the system (such as equal error rate (EER)
etc.). In this paper, we use biohashing as an example algo-
rithm for extracting binary biometric templates. Random
projection and thresholding used in biohashing is a well-
known type of LSH approach [78]. Although biohashing
has its own security and privacy preservation mechanism,
we do not rely on these to address the security or privacy
concerns.
Biohash is a binary and pseudo-random representa-
tion of a biometric template. Biohashing schemes use two
inputs: 1) Biometric template, 2) User’s secret key. A bio-
metric feature vector is transformed into a lower dimen-
sion sub-space using a pseudo-random set of orthogonal
vectors which are generated from the user’s secret key.
Then, the result is binarized to produce a pseudo-random
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bit-string which is called the biohash. In an ideal case,
the Hamming distance between the biohashes belonging
to the biometric templates of the same user is expected
to be relatively small. On the other hand, the distance
between the biohashes of different users is expected to be
sufficiently high to achieve higher recognition rates.
We adopt the random projection (RP)-based biohashing
scheme proposed by Ngo et al. [79]. In this scheme, there
are three main steps: 1) Feature extraction, 2) Random
projection, 3) Quantization. These steps are explained in
the following.
3.2.1 Feature extraction
The feature extraction is performed on the biometric data
(e.g., face image) which is collected at the enrollment
stage, belonging to users, Ii,j ∈ m×n for i = 1, · · · , n
and j = 1, · · · , L where n and L denote the number of
users and the number of training images per user, respec-
tively. The images are lexicographically re-ordered and the
training vectors, xi,j ∈ (mn)×1, are obtained. Then, Prin-
ciple Component Analysis (PCA) [63] is applied to these
vectors as follows
yi,j = A
(xi,j − w) , (1)
where A ∈ k×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained by the
images in the training set, w is the mean face vector, and
yi,j ∈ k×1 is the vector containing the PCA coefficients
belonging to the jth training image of the ith user.
3.2.2 Random projection (RP)
An RP matrix, R ∈ ×k , is generated to reduce the
dimension of the PCA coefficient vectors. The RP matrix
elements are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) and generated from a Gauss distribution with zero
mean and unit variance by using a Random Number Gen-
erator (RNG) with a seed derived from the user’s secret
key. The Gram-Schmidt (GS) procedure is applied to
obtain an orthonormal projection matrix RGS ∈ ×k to
have more distinct projections. Finally, the PCA coeffi-
cients are projected onto a lower -dimensional subspace
using
zi,j = RGSyi,j (2)
where zi,j ∈ ×1 is an intermediate biohash vector
belonging to the jth training image of the ith user.
3.2.3 Quantization
The elements of the intermediate biohash vector zi,j are
binarized with respect to a threshold as follows
λki,j =
{
1 if zki,j ≥ β
0 Otherwise, (3)
where λi,j ∈ {0, 1} denotes biohash vector of the jth train-
ing image of the ith user and β denotes the mean value of
the intermediate biohash vector zi,j.
A biohash vector, Benrolli for the ith user, which can
be any vector among λi,j vectors in a real-world appli-
cation, is stored in the database during the enrollment
stage, which is accessed for verification purpose later dur-
ing the authentication phase. For simulation purposes, we
take into account all possible biohashes for a user by com-
puting λi,j. The user is authenticated when the Hamming
distance between Benrolli and Bauthi is below a threshold
μ, where Bauthi is the biohash vector measured during the
authentication stage as follows
n∑
k=1
Bkenrolli ⊕ Bkauthi ≤ μ, (4)
where Bkenrolli denotes the kth bit of Benrolli , B
k
authi denotes
the kth bit ofBauthi , and⊕ denotes the binary XOR (exclu-
sive OR) operator. Consequently, the verifier decides
whether the prover is an authorized user depending on the
threshold, μ.
4 The proposed biometric authentication system
stop In this section, we introduce the THRIVE system
which has two participants: User (Ui) and Verifier (V).
The user has control of the biometric sensor, the fea-
ture extractor, and the biohash generator whereas the
verifier has control of the database and the matcher as
can be observed in Fig. 3 in the enrollment stage and
Fig. 4 in the authentication stage. We assume that there
is a trusted third party (TTP) which initially sets up the
system public/private keys.
The TTP distributes the keys in the proposed system.







are shared between the user and the verifier. Here, sk1i is
the private key share of the ith user, Ui, and sk2i is the pri-
vate key share of the verifier. pki is the public key of the ith
user, Ui, and both the user and the verifier know it. When
an enrollment biometric template is encrypted by pki,










since the proposed system is based on the (2, 2)-threshold





, which belongs to the
ith user, Ui, where pkUi is the public key and skUi is its
associated private key to perform the signature operation.
The verifier also knows the public key pkUi .
4.1 Enrollment stage
The proposed enrollment protocol is illustrated in Fig. 5
and its steps are introduced as follows:
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Fig. 3 Enrollment. Illustration of the THRIVE enrollment stage
1. Step 1: The i th user, Ui, computes her biohash,
Benrolli = B1enrolli · · ·Bnenrolli where B
j
enrolli ∈ {0, 1},





for j = 1, · · · , n, by using the
public key pki. Then, the user signs her encrypted
biohash, SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
, and sends
it to the verifier.
2. Step 2: The verifier V verifies
SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
by using pkUi and
stores the signature and encrypted biohash in the
database. This data will be used for verification at the
authentication stage.
Note that both the user and the verifier have to coop-
erate to decrypt a ciphertext due to the (2, 2)-threshold
homomorphic cryptosystem. Furthermore, the signature
ensures that the data stored in the database is generated
by an authorized user.
Lemma 1. Biohashes are not revealed at the enrollment
stage.
Proof. (Sketch) At the enrollment stage, the ith user Ui
first encrypts her biohash and then signs it. After these
computations,Ui sends her encrypted and signed biohash
SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
to the verifier. Since the
user’s biohash is not sent in plain form, biohashes are not
revealed to the verifier at the enrollment stage.
Lemma 2. An adversary cannot register as a user at the
enrollment stage.
Proof. (Sketch) At the enrollment stage, the ith user
Ui encrypts her biohash by using the public key pki
and then signs her encrypted biohash by using her pri-
vate key skUi . Thus, Ui sends encrypted and signed
biohash SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
to the verifier.
Since the verifier verifies the signature of the user,
an adversary cannot register himself as a user with-
out knowing the user private key skUi used to compute
SignskUi
(




In this stage, Ui tries to prove herself to the verifier by
executing the proposed authentication protocol shown in
Fig. 6. Similar to the enrollment case, the biometric sensor
must be authorized by the system before the authentica-
tion protocol is carried out. Steps of the protocol are given
as follows:
1. Step 1: Ui wants to verify her identity by using her
biohash and sends a connection request to the
verifier. Then, Ui computes her biohash Bauthi =
Fig. 4 Authentication. Illustration of the THRIVE authentication stage
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Fig. 5 Enrollment protocol. The proposed enrollment protocol of the THRIVE system
B1authi · · ·Bnauthi where B
j
authi ∈ {0, 1}, j = 1, · · · , n.
Note that the user cannot produce exactly the same
biometric template at each attempt and this results in
different biohashes computed by the same user.
Therefore, Benrolli and Bauthi are different biohashes
although they are generated by the same user at
different sessions (e.g., enrollment and
authentication stages). First, Ui chooses a random
vector rji ∈R {0, 1} for j = 1, · · · , n. She computes
Rji = rji ⊕ Bjauthi for j = 1, · · · , n. Then, Ui generates
a nonce, nonceUi , which is uniquely defined and
contains information about user id, session id, and
timestamp. Finally, the user sends < Rji : j =
1, · · · , n >, nonceUi to the verifier.
2. Step 2: The verifier retrieves
SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
from the database




for j = 1, · · · , n. Then, it
generates a nonce nonceVi which contains
information about the verifier, session id, and
timestamp. Finally, it sends
SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
, nonceVi to the user.
3. Step 3: The user verifies
SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
by using public key











for j = 1, · · · , n. Then, she
Fig. 6 Authentication protocol. The proposed authentication protocol of the THRIVE system
Karabat et al. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing  (2015) 2015:71 Page 11 of 18










)(−p1i −q1i )/4 mod Ni, for







,T1,ji : j = 1, · · · ,
n >, nonceUi , nonceVi
)
to the verifier.







,T1,ji : j = 1, · · · , n >,
nonceUi , nonceVi
)
by using the public key pkUi .




· Cji (this is done
to assure correctness of the result and will prevent a
malicious user computing different values than
expected.). Next, the verifier performs the full






)(−p2i −q2i )/4 mod Ni and T3,ji =(
C′′ji
)(N−p0i −q0i +1)/4 mod Ni. Finally, the verifier
computes the decrypted j th bits Tji =(
1 − T1,ji T2,ji T3,ji mod Ni
)
/2 and the Hamming
distance between Rji and T
j
i is calculated as follows
n∑
j=1
Rji ⊕ Tji ≤ μ, (5)
where μ is the distance threshold. Therefore, the
verifier decides whether the user is authentic with
respect to the pre-defined distance threshold. Note
that the Hamming distance between rji ⊕ Bjenrolli and




Finally, the verifier sends its decision (either Accept
or Reject) to the user. However, the user may get
dummy output if there is an error or an attack (i.e.,
override response attack) in the communication
channel. The proposed system can easily be updated
to cope with such an attack, for instance, by allowing
the verifier to sign its decision including the nonces
generated during the authentication session (i.e.,
either Sign(Accept, nonceUi , nonceVi ) or Sign
(Reject, nonceUi , nonceVi ) and then sends it to the
user. This way, authenticity, integrity, and origin of
the data can easily be verified. Signing the nonces
(nonceUi and nonceVi ) also makes the
communication unique and avoids replay attacks.
Lemma 3. Biohashes are not revealed at the authentica-
tion stage.
Proof. Authentication is performed in a randomized
domain. In other words, the authentication is determined
by comparing Rji and T
j
i . An adversary can only obtain
Rji and T
j
i which are revealed at the authentication stage.
Recall that these are randomized biohashes. Thus, from







and two equations which are shown in
the below.
Tji = rji ⊕ Bjenrolli (6)
Rji = rji ⊕ Bjauthi (7)
where rji is the random bit generated by the Ui for the
jth bit. Since this is a linear equation system with fewer
equations than unknowns, it has many solutions. Con-
sequently, it is impossible for the adversary to obtain
a honest user’s biohash by using Tji and R
j
i which are
revealed at the authentication stage. As a result, the pro-
posed biometric authentication system ensures security
and privacy.
5 Security proof of the proposed authentication
protocol
In this section, we prove that the proposed authentica-
tion protocol shown in Fig. 6 is secure against malicious
users and the verifier. More concretely, the primary goal
of privacy preservation is to protect users’ biometric tem-
plates during protocol executions. In a secure computa-
tion framework, parties have their own private input and
are willing to evaluate a desired functionality f on their
inputs without revealing any information except the out-
puts. This was originally formalized by Goldreich et al.
in [80]. Intuitively, the following two scenarios should
be absolutely indistinguishable: 1) securely computing f
by realizing a protocol, and 2) privately sending their
private inputs to a trusted third party, who then com-
putes f and privately returns the outputs to each party.
This formalization of secure computation is referred to as
the simulation-based approach. The idea of the standard
simulation-based privacy definition is that, given a well-
defined privacy-leakage, a polynomial-time simulator (i.e.,
an adversary) can generate a transcript that is indistin-
guishable from the output of the real protocol. If such
an efficient simulator exists, then an adversary cannot
learn any additional information beyond the defined leak-
age. The simulator must perform its task without know-
ing the private information of the party who proves her
identity [80].
In this proof, we show that given a party is corrupted
(either user or verifier), there exists a simulator that can
produce a view which is statistically indistinguishable
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from the view of that party interacting with the other hon-
est party. Assuming that one party is corrupted, we build
an efficient simulator that has access to the public input
and private secret shares of the secret key of the corrupted
party. Besides, the simulator knows the public output. We
want to point out that the simulator already knows the
shares of the secret key of the corrupted party before the
simulation is run. Since the threshold cryptosystem is set
up before the protocol starts, we assume that the simu-
lator extracts this information when the distributed key
generation is run.
It is worth mentioning that the proposed authentication
protocol gives computational privacy to both the user and
the verifier due to the semantic security of the underlying
cryptosystem. Furthermore, it is shown that the proposed
authentication protocol is simulatable for both parties
and these simulations produce views which are statisti-
cally indistinguishable from the views in the real protocol
executions.
Theorem 1. The proposed authentication protocol
shown in Fig. 6 is secure in the presence of static malicious
adversaries.
Proof. We show that given a party is corrupted, there
exists a simulator that can produce a view to the adver-
sary that is statistically indistinguishable from the view in
the real protocol execution based on its private decryption
share as well as public information.
Case 1 - User Ui is corrupted. In this case, we prove the
security for the case where Ui is corrupted. The simulator
has the private key share of the user sk1i , the user’s pri-
vate key skUi , and the user’s biohash B
j
authi apart from the
user’s public information (i.e., pkUi and pki) as described
in the proposed authentication protocol. The simulator
constructs a view for the user which is statistically close
to the one the user observes when interacting with the
honest verifier by using this information. The simulator
proceeds as follows:
1. The simulator first obtains
< Rji : j = 1, · · · , n >, nonceUi . As in the second
round of the real protocol, the simulator needs to
output the signature of the encrypted biohash of the





for j = 1, · · · , n by using the
user’s public key pki, and then computes
SignskUi
(〈
C˜ji : j = 1, · · · , n
)〉
. The simulator also
generates a nonce called ˜nonceVi . The values
SignskUi
(〈
C˜ji : j = 1, · · · , n
)〉
and ˜nonceVi are the
simulated outputs. Note that the simulator uses B˜auth
instead of Benroll since it is the only available biohash
to him.







T1,ji : j = 1, · · · , n >, nonceUi , ˜nonceVi
)
as in the
second round of the protocol. The simulator next







T1,ji : j = 1, · · · , n >, nonceUi , ˜nonceVi
)
that Ui





Given C˜′′ji , its plaintext and the share of private key
sk2i of the user Ui the decryption shares T
2,j
i can be





mod N from the public




mod N since it knows sk1i (i.e., p1, q1). Let b˜ denote
the plaintext of C˜′′ji . Then, the simulator can
compute b˜2 mod N ≡ (1 − 2˜b)/(b˜0b˜1) mod N
(which is T2,ji in the real protocol). Note that in the
real setting this is not possible since the plaintext
inside the ciphertext is unknown C˜′′ji .
Similarly, T3,ji can also be simulated since p0i and q0i





i ⊕ Tji .
Each step of the proposed authentication protocol for
the simulator is simulated and this completes the simu-
lation for the malicious user. The transcript is consistent
and statistically indistinguishable from the user’s view
when interacting with the honest verifier.
Case 2 - The verifier V is corrupted. We now prove the
security for the case where the verifier is corrupted. The




apart from the verifier’s public information (i.e., pkUi ,
pki, and SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
) as described in
the proposed authentication protocol. The simulator con-
structs a view for the verifier which is statistically close
to the one when interacting with the honest user by using
this information. The simulator proceeds as follows:
1. Note that the simulator already knows
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n > because of the knowledge of
SignskUi
(
< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
. The simulator
chooses a random bit r˜ji and arbitrary B˜
j
authi ∈R {0, 1}
and computes R˜ji = r˜ji ⊕ B˜jauthi . Recall that the
simulator must perform its task without knowing the
private information of the honest user in this case.
Thus, although it does not have real rji and B
j
authi , it
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can successfully execute the simulated conversation
since R˜ji is uniformly random.
2. The simulator obtains
SignskUi
(






< Cji : j = 1, · · · , n >
)
(by using the user’s
public key pkUi ) that V would run. Next, it next
computes C˜′ji = Encpki(r˜ji) · Cji .
3. Given C˜′ji , its plaintext (which is r˜
j
i ⊕ Bjenrolli ) and the
share of private key sk2i of the verifier V the
decryption share T˜1,ji can also be simulated as follows:









mod N since it knows sk2i (i.e.,
p2, q2). Let b˜ denote the plaintext of C˜′ji . Then, the
simulator can compute b˜1 mod N ≡ (1 − 2˜b)/
(b˜0b˜2) mod N (which is T1,ji in the real protocol).
Note that in the real setting, this is not possible since
the plaintext inside the ciphertext is unknown C˜′′ji .







,T1,ji : j = 1, · · · , n >,
nonceUi , nonceVi
)
. However, this is not possible
since the simulator does not know skUi . In order to
successfully simulate this final step, we need to
provide additional information to the simulator. For
example, performing a following modification over
the key generation phase in the real protocol, the
simulation will be possible:
• During the key generation in the real protocol,
the private key skUi is distributed to the user Ui
and V in a threshold fashion. For example,
distributed RSA setting can be used for the
signature algorithm (note that for an RSA
setting (e, n) denotes the public key and (p, q, d)
denotes the private key where n = pq and
ed ≡ 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1)). Namely, the
private key d can be divided into d1 and d2
such that the ciphertext c can be decrypted
together with Ui and V as m ≡ cd ≡ cd1+d2
mod n.
• In order to simulate, instead of signing
procedures, Ui will compute an encryption,
compute its partial decryption and finally will
send to the verifier. This will assure that the user
indeed used its private decryption key over the
encrypted value. Next, the verifier will also
compute its partial decryption and will compute
the decrypted value privately.
Thus, with this modified version the decryption
share can be simulated in a similar way as described
at the third step of the simulation.
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication
protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes
the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript
is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the
verifier’s view when interacting with the honest user.
6 Complexity analysis of the proposed system
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the THRIVE
enrollment and authentication protocols. The complex-
ity of the THRIVE enrollment and authentication pro-
tocols are examined in terms of protocol steps for the
round complexity, the number of cryptographic opera-
tions for the computational complexity and the number
of messages exchanged by the two parties for the com-
munication complexity. Without loss of generality, we
will provide complexity of the THRIVE protocols using
the (2,2)-threshold homomorphic GM cryptosystem as
an instance [73]. In the protocol, we use (2,2)-threshold
XOR-homomorphic GM cryptosystem for confidentiality
(i.e., encryption and decryption) while for signature gen-
eration and verification a conventional cryptosystem such
as RSA (using the key pair (pkUi , skUi)) is employed.
The round complexity of the enrollment protocol is only
one. For the computational complexity, the enrollment
protocol requires n XOR-homomorphic encryptions, and
one conventional signature generation for a user, but one
signature verification for the server. For the communica-
tion complexity, the user sends a conventional signature
and n ciphertexts (i.e., Cji for j = 1, · · · , n).
In the authentication protocol, there are only four
rounds. For the computational complexity of the authen-
tication protocol, the user generates one conven-
tional signature and verifies another, computes n XOR-
homomorphic encryptions and n XOR-homomorphic
decryptions, and performs nmodular multiplications over




· Cji for j =
1, · · · , n). The verifier verifies one conventional signature,
computes n + 2 modular multiplications, 2n decryptions,




for j = 1, · · · , n. In total, there are n XOR-homomorphic
encryptions, 3nXOR-homomorphic decryptions, two sig-
nature verifications, one signature generation, n Jacobi
computations, and 2n+ 2 modular multiplications during
the entire authentication protocol.
For the communication complexity of the authen-
tication protocol, the user sends 2n homomorphic
ciphertexts, one conventional signature and one nonce
value. The verifier sends one conventional signature, n
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homomorphic ciphertexts, and one nonce to the user.
In total, 3n homomorphic ciphertexts, two conventional
signatures, and two nonce values are exchanged.
In the following, we provide timing estimates for the
entire protocol for 80-bit security level, on a desktop com-
puter, which has Intel processor with various clock speeds
(2.4 and 3.2 GHz). On the computing platform indepen-
dent from the clock speed, one modular multiplication
using Montgomery arithmetic takes about 2000 clock
cycles. Furthermore, one encryption operation in XOR-
homomorphic GM cryptosystem takes only a single mod-
ular multiplication. On the other hand, one decryption
in XOR-homomorphic GM cryptosystem requires one
modular exponentiation operation which takes about 3.2
million clock cycles. In addition, one signature generation
and verification operation in conventional cryptosystem
such as RSA are equivalent to onemodular exponentiation
operation.
The bandwidth usage of the proposed protocol for
various lengths of biohashes of the user are given in
Table 1. The required bandwidth for the proposed pro-
tocol increases with the increasing length of the biohash.
Bandwidth usage also affects the overall connection time.
The computation times for the user and the verifier at
2.4 GHz for the proposed protocol with different biohash
lengths are given in Table 2. Naturally, it is expected that
the required computation times of the proposed protocol
increase as lengths of the biohashes increase.
In our timing estimates, we assume sequential (i.e.,
single-threaded) implementations of the user and server
sides of the protocol that run on a single core. On the
other hand, one advantage of the proposed system from
the time complexity point of view is that majority of the
expensive operations (i.e., mainly modular exponentia-
tions) can be performed in parallel. Therefore, custom
ASIC [81] or GPU implementations [82] can accelerate
protocol considerably. For instance, the custom modular
exponentiation circuit for RSA in [81] reports 0.89ms exe-
cution time on a circuit of 153,000 equivalent gate counts.
With specialized hardware that incorporates many cus-
tom modular exponentiation modules, overall execution
time can be reduced significantly. Similarly, a GPU imple-
mentation is reported [82] to reach the peak throughtput
Table 1 Bandwidth (total number of bits exchanged) usage of
the proposed protocol






Table 2 Computation time for the user and the verifier at 2.4 GHz






of 34,981 RSA-1024 decryptions per second with 2.6 ms
latency. Apparently, a parallel GPU implementation of
modular exponentiation will trivialize the computation
complexity of the proposed technique. Finally, we expect
an acceleration proportional to the number of cores if the
protocol is implemented on a multi-core CPU platform.
We compare the communication complexity of the pro-
posed system with the existing systems in the literature
assuming that all systems run on a computer platform
with 2.4 GHz clock speed. Erkin et al.’s system [41]
requires 56.25 ms, Barni et al.’s system [20, 43] requires
50 ms and Sadeghi et al.’s system [42] requires 25 ms
for authentication at the server side for single user with
112-bit binary feature vector [20]. On the other hand,
our solution requires 449 ms for the same authentica-
tion setup. Although existing solutions seem faster than
the proposed system, they propose their solutions in
the semi-honest model whereas our solution is secure
under malicious adversary model. The similar timing esti-
mations are also computed for 3.2 GHz as shown in
Table 3.
We also compare the communication complexity of the
proposed system with those of the existing systems at 3.2
GHz in the literature. Kulkarni et al.’s system [64] requires
58 s at the server side, 10 ms at the user side, and 400 Kbit
bandwidth usage for authentication of single user with
2048-bit binary feature vector at 3.2 GHz. Our proposed
system requires 6146 ms at the server side, 2051 ms at the
user side, and 6296 Kbit bandwidth usage for the same
authentication setup. Thus, it is faster than Kulkarni et al.’s
system. In addition, our proposes system offers other
advantages such as that it is secure under malicious adver-
sary model, that the biometric is protected via both a tem-
plate protection method (e.g., biohash) and cryptographic
Table 3 Computation time for the user and the verifier at 3.2 GHz






Karabat et al. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing  (2015) 2015:71 Page 15 of 18
primitives (e.g., threshold homomorphic encryption). On
the other hand, Kulkarni et al.’s system offers solution for
semi-honest model which also means that it is insecure
for the malicious model. The comprehensive comparison
between the proposed system and existing systems are
shown in Fig. 7.
7 Comparison between the proposed system and
the existingmethods/systems
In this section, we compare the proposed THRIVE system
with currently available biometric template protection
solutions in the literature. The comprehensive compari-
son between the proposed system and existing solutions
are shown in Fig. 7. This comparison is performed by
checking whether they use or satisfy the following prop-
erties or not. These properties are given in the below but
more information can be found in Sections 2 and 3.
• Irreversibility: It is computationally hard to
reconstruct the original biometric template by using
the protected biometric template (e.g., biohash,
encrypted biometric data).
• Renewability: It is possible to generate different
protected templates from the same biometric data of
a user.
• Diversity: Different protected templates generated
from the same biometric data of a user do not allow
cross-matching or information leakage.
• Helper data: It is auxiliary data/side information,
which is needed for running biometric system
successfully (e.g., data for alignment, parity bits of
error correction codes). Without use of helper data
such biometric systems do not work properly.
Furthermore, an attacker may deduce further
information that can threat privacy of a user and
security of a system from helper data.
• Homomorphic encryption: It is an encryption
method, which allows computations to be carried out
on ciphertext and obtaining the same results with the
operations performed on the plaintext.
• Threshold homomorphic encryption: It is a special
type of homomorphic encryption, which distributes
the knowledge of a private key among n parties and at
least t of the parties are required for successful
decryption. This method can also ensure security of
biometric data stored in the database. Even if
biometric templates are encrypted, a database
manager can easily decrypt them as soon as he knows
the private key. However, threshold homomorphic
encryption requires cooperation between parties for a
successful decryption.
• Semi-honest attack model: In this adversary model, all
parties follow the protocol but dishonest party may be
curious to violate others privacy by keeping a record
of all its intermediate computations and messages.
This is weak attack model in comparison with
Fig. 7 Comparison. We compare the THRIVE system with the existing biometric template protection solutions with respect to various properties
(e.g., irreversibility, renewability, diversity, helper data, homomorphic encryption, threshold homomorphic encryption, semi-honest attack model,
malicious attack model). Checkmark denotes that the system satisfies the property whereas Xmark denotes that the system does not satisfy the
property
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malicious attack model. Semi-honest adversaries are
also called honest-but-curious or passive attackers.
• Malicious attack model: In this adversary model,
attacker makes arbitrary feasible deviation(s) from
the protocol specification and does not have to follow
instructions of the protocol. A malicious attacker can
enter the protocol with arbitrary input, which may
not be a true input, and this makes the malicious
model harder to deal with. Malicious adversaries are
also called active attackers.
It is clearly seen in Fig. 7 that the proposed THRIVE
system offers superior security and privacy preservation
solutions under the malicious attack model.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a novel biometric authentica-
tion system. The aim of the THRIVE system is to increase
security against adversary attacks defined in [83] and pre-
serve the privacy of users. The proposed system can be
used with any biometric feature extraction method which
can produce binary templates or whose templates can be
binarized by post-processing. The biohashing is chosen as
an example binary biometric template generation system
since it offers satisfactory performance and fast authen-
tication. The comparison is performed in a randomized
domain at the authentication stage and the binary tem-
plates (e.g., biohashes) are never released. In addition, only
encrypted binary templates are stored in the database.
Since we use the (2, 2)-threshold cryptosystem, the ver-
ifier cannot decrypt the data stored in the database by
itself. Namely, the user and the verifier both has to coop-
erate to decrypt the encrypted binary templates. The
THRIVE system can be used in applications where the
user is not willing to reveal her biometrics to the ver-
ifier although she needs to proof her physical presence
by using biometrics. It is also suitable for applications
where the user and the verifier do not necessarily trust
each other. The THRIVE system appears to be sufficiently
efficient compared to the existing scheme and can be
used in real-life applications. A common drawback of all
existing schemes (including the THRIVE system), which
consider the existence of malicious verifiers, is to utilize
expensive asymmetric encryptions. Providing more effi-
cient constructions (i.e., less communication, storage and
computational overheads) while ensuring user privacy in
the presence of malicious verifiers is still an open problem.
Biometric authentication systems work with some error
rates which can be represented by using equal error rate
(EER), false acceptance rate (FAR), and false rejection rate
(FRR). These error rates may occur due to the nature
of biometric data and can vary with respect to the vari-
ous factors. The proposed THRIVE system can work with
any biometric authentication scheme whose outputs can
be binarized. The main goal of the THRIVE system is to
increase security of authentication process and enhance
privacy of users. Error rates (e.g., EER, FAR, FRR) of
the THRIVE system related with authentication process
is dependent on chosen biometric modality, underlying
feature extraction method, and biometric authentication
scheme (e.g., biohashing is given as an example in this
paper).
Endnote
1A nonce is an arbitrary number used only once in a
cyptosystem.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Acknowledgements
This work has been supported by the BEAT project 7th Framework Research
Programme of the European Union (EU), grant agreement number: 284989.
The authors would like to thank the EU for the financial support and the
partners within the consortium for a fruitful collaboration. For more
information about the BEAT consortium, please visit http://www.beat-eu.org.
Author details
1TÜBI˙TAK BI˙LGEM UEKAE, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey. 2Sabanci University, Tuzla,
Istanbul, Turkey.
Received: 23 February 2015 Accepted: 21 July 2015
References
1. AK Jain, A Ross, S Prabhakar, An introduction to biometric recognition.
IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol. 14, 4–20 (2004)
2. S Prabhakar, S Pankanti, AK Jain, Biometric recognition: Security and
privacy concerns. IEEE Secur. Privacy. 1(2), 33–42 (2003)
3. AK Jain, K Nandakumar, A Nagar, Biometric template security. EURASIP J.
Adv. Signal Process. 2008, 113–111317 (2008)
4. NK Ratha, JH Connell, RM Bolle, Enhancing security and privacy in
biometrics-based authentication systems. IBM Syst. J. 40(3),
614–634 (2001)
5. C Roberts, Biometric attack vectors and defences. Comput. Secur. 26(1),
14–25 (2007)
6. F Hao, R Anderson, J Daugman, Combining crypto with biometrics
effectively. IEEE Trans. Comput. 55(9), 1081–1088 (2006)
7. S Kanade, D Petrovska-Delacretaz, B Dorizzi, in Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, 2009. CVPR 2009. IEEE Conference On. Cancelable iris
biometrics and using error correcting codes to reduce variability in
biometric data (Miami, FL, 2009), pp. 120–127
8. A Juels, M Wattenberg, in CCS ’99, Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security. A fuzzy commitment scheme
(Singapore, 1999), pp. 28–36
9. TAM Kevenaar, GJ Schrijen, M van der Veen, AHM Akkermans, F Zuo, in
Proceedings of the Fourth IEEEWorkshop on Automatic Identification
Advanced Technologies. AUTOID ’05. Face recognition with renewable and
privacy preserving binary templates, (2005), pp. 21–26.
doi:10.1109/AUTOID.2005.24
10. GI Davida, Y Frankel, BJ Matt, in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. On
enabling secure applications through off-line biometric identification
(Oakland, CA, 1998), pp. 148–157
11. S Tulyakov, F Farooq, V Govindaraju, in ICAPR (2). Symmetric hash functions
for fingerprint minutiae, (2005), pp. 30–38. doi:10.1007/11552499_4
12. Y Sutcu, Q Li, N Memon, in SPIE Conf on Security, Steganography and
Watermarking of Multimedia Contents IX. How to protect biometric
templates, (2007). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07857-1_27
13. A Stoianov, T Kevenaar, M van der Veen, in Science and Technology for
Humanity (TIC-STH), 2009 IEEE Toronto International Conference. Security
issues of biometric encryption (Toronto, ON, 2009), pp. 34–39
Karabat et al. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing  (2015) 2015:71 Page 17 of 18
14. X Zhou, Privacy and security assessment of biometric template
protection. IT - Inform. Technol. 54(4), 197 (2012)
15. X Zhou, A Kuijper, R Veldhuis, C Busch, in Proceedings of the 2011
International Joint Conference on Biometrics, IJCB ’11. Quantifying privacy
and security of biometric fuzzy commitment (IEEE Computer Society
Washington, DC, USA, 2011), pp. 1–8
16. S Cimato, M Gamassi, V Piuri, R Sassi, F Scotti, in CIS. A biometric verification
system addressing privacy concerns (Harbin, 2007), pp. 594–598
17. T Matsumoto, H Matsumoto, K Yamada, S Hoshino, Impact of artificial
"gummy" fingers on fingerprint systems. Datenschutz und
Datensicherheit. 26(8) (2002). doi:10.1117/12.462719
18. T van der Putte, J Keuning, in CARDIS. Biometrical fingerprint recognition:
Don’t get your fingers burned, (2000), pp. 289–306. ISBN:0-7923-7953-5
19. J Bringer, H Chabanne, GD Cohen, B Kindarji, G Zémor, Optimal iris fuzzy
sketches. CoRR abs/0705.3740 (2007). doi:10.1109/BTAS.2007.4401904
20. M Barni, T Bianchi, D Catalano, M Di Raimondo, R Donida Labati, P Failla,
D Fiore, R Lazzeretti, V Piuri, F Scotti, A Piva, in Proceedings of the 12th ACM
Workshop onMultimedia and Security. Privacy-preserving fingercode
authentication (ACM New York, NY, USA, 2010), pp. 231–240
21. K Nandakumar, AK Jain, S Pankanti, Fingerprint-based fuzzy vault:
Implementation and performance. IEEE Trans. Inform. Forensics Secur.
2(4), 744–757 (2007)
22. YC Feng, PC Yuen, AK Jain, A hybrid approach for generating secure and
discriminating face template. Trans. Info. For. Sec. 5(1), 103–117 (2010)
23. FM Bui, K Martin, H Lu, KN Plataniotis, D Hatzinakos, Fuzzy key binding
strategies based on quantization index modulation (QIM) for biometric
encryption (be) applications. IEEE Trans. Inform. Forensics Secur. 5(1),
118–132 (2010)
24. A Juels, M Sudan, A fuzzy vault scheme. Des. Codes Cryptography. 38(2),
237–257 (2006)
25. C Karabat, H Erdogan, in Proceedings of the 2009 Fifth International
Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding andMultimedia Signal
Processing. A cancelable biometric hashing for secure biometric
verification system (Kyoto, 2009), pp. 1082–1085
26. Z Bai, D Hatzinakos, in Control Automation Robotics Vision (ICARCV), 2010
11th International Conference On. Lbp-based biometric hashing scheme
for human authentication (Singapore, 2010), pp. 1842–1847
27. YW Kuan, ABJ Teoh, DCL Ngo, Secure hashing of dynamic hand
signatures using wavelet-fourier compression with biophasor mixing and
2n discretization. EURASIP J. Adv. Sig. Proc. 2007 (2007).
doi:10.1155/2007/59125
28. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, Iris-biometric hash generation for biometric database
indexing. Pattern Recognit. Int. Conf., 2848–2851 (2010).
doi:10.1109/ICPR.2010.698
29. R Lumini, L Nanni, An improved biohashing for human authentication.
Pattern Recognit. 40, 1057–1065 (2006)
30. WJ Scheirer, TE Boult, in Proceedings of Biometrics Symposium. Cracking
fuzzy vaults and biometric encryption (Baltimore, MD, 2007), pp. 1–6
31. A Adler, in In International Conference on Audio and Video Based Biometric
Person Authentication. Vulnerabilities in biometric encryption systems
(Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005), pp. 1100–1109
32. TE Boult, WJ Scheirer, R Woodworth, in CVPR. Revocable fingerprint
biotokens: Accuracy and security analysis (Minneapolis, MN, 2007)
33. A Kong, K-H Cheung, D Zhang, M Kamel, J You, An analysis of biohashing
and its variants. Pattern Recogn. 39, 1359–1368 (2006)
34. K Kommel, C Vielhauer, in Proceedings of the 12th ACMWorkshop on
Multimedia and Security.MMSec ’10. Reverse-engineer methods on a
biometric hash algorithm for dynamic handwriting (ACM New York, NY,
USA, 2010), pp. 67–72
35. KH Cheung, AW-K Kong, J You, D Zhang, in CISST. An analysis on
invertibility of cancelable biometrics based on biohashing
(Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005), pp. 40–45
36. K Kummel, C Vielhauer, T Scheidat, D Franke, J Dittmann, in Proceedings of
the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 International Conference on Communications and
Multimedia Security. Handwriting biometric hash attack: a genetic
algorithm with user interaction for raw data reconstruction, (2010),
pp. 178–190. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-13241-4_17
37. K Simoens, P Tuyls, B Preneel, in Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE SP’09. Privacy weaknesses in
biometric sketches (Berkeley, CA, 2009), pp. 188–203
38. T Ignatenko, FMJ Willems, Information leakage in fuzzy commitment
schemes. IEEE Trans. Inform. Forensics Security. 5(2), 337–348 (2010)
39. K Simoens, J Bringer, H Chabanne, S Seys, A framework for analyzing
template security and privacy in biometric authentication systems. IEEE
Trans. Inform. Forensics Secur. 7(2), 833–841 (2012)
40. T Ignatenko, FMJ Willems, Biometric systems: privacy and secrecy aspects.
Trans. Info. For. Sec. 4(4), 956–973 (2009)
41. Z Erkin, M Franz, J Guajardo, S Katzenbeisser, I Lagendijk, T Toft, in
Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies. PETS ’09. Privacy-preserving face recognition (Seattle, WA,
USA, 2009), pp. 235–253
42. A-R Sadeghi, T Schneider, I Wehrenberg, in ICISC. Efficient
privacy-preserving face recognition (Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg,
2009), pp. 229–244
43. M Barni, T Bianchi, D Catalano, M Di Raimondo, RD Labati, P Failla, D Fiore,
R Lazzeretti, V Piuri, A Piva, F Scotti, in Biometrics: Theory Applications and
Systems (BTAS), 2010 Fourth IEEE International Conference On. A privacy-
compliant fingerprint recognition system based on homomorphic
encryption and fingercode templates (Washington, DC, Sept. 2010)
44. Y Sutcu, HT Sencar, N Memon, in Proceedings of the 7thWorkshop on
Multimedia and Security. A secure biometric authentication scheme based
on robust hashing (ACM New York, NY, USA, 2005), pp. 111–116
45. ATB Jin, K-A Toh, WK Yip, in ICB. 2ns discretisation of biophasor in
cancellable biometrics (Seoul, Korea, 2007), pp. 435–444
46. B Yang, C Busch, P Bours, D Gafurov, inMedia Forensics and Security.
Robust minutiae hash for fingerprint template protection (San Jose, CA,
USA, 2010)
47. U Uludag, S Pankanti, AK Jain, in Proceedings of the IEEE. Biometric
cryptosystems: Issues and challenges, (2004), pp. 948–960.
doi:10.1109/JPROC.2004.827372
48. C Rathgeb, A Uhl, in Computer Vision and Pattern RecognitionWorkshops
(CVPRW), 2011 IEEE Computer Society Conference On. Statistical attack
against iris-biometric fuzzy commitment schemes (Colorado Springs, CO,
2011), pp. 23–30
49. T Ignatenko, F Willems, in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International
Conference on Symposium on Information Theory - Volume 4. ISIT’09. Secret
rate - privacy leakage in biometric systems (Seoul, 2009), pp. 2251–2255
50. A Stoianov, in Privacy Security and Trust (PST), 2010 Eighth Annual
International Conference On. Security of error correcting code for
biometric encryption (Ottawa, ON, 2010), pp. 231–235
51. E-C Chang, R Shen, FW Teo, in Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on
Information, Computer and Communications Security. Finding the original
point set hidden among chaff (ACM New York, NY, USA, 2006),
pp. 182–188
52. A Kholmatov, B Yanikoglu, Realization of correlation attack against the
fuzzy vault scheme (2008). doi:10.1117/12.766861
53. Y Dodis, R Ostrovsky, L Reyzin, A Smith, Fuzzy extractors: How to generate
strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. SIAM J. Comput. 38(1),
97–139 (2008)
54. Y Dodis, B Kanukurthi, J Katz, L Reyzin, A Smith, Robust fuzzy extractors
and authenticated key agreement from close secrets. IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory. 58(9), 6207–6222 (2012)
55. Y Sutcu, L Qiming, N Memon, in Proceedings of SPIE Optics and Photonics in
Global Homeland Security V and Biometric Technology for Human
Identification VI. Design and analysis of fuzzy extractors for faces, vol. 7305,
(2009). doi:10.1117/12.820571
56. TS Ong, ABJ Teoh, in Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on
Information Assurance and Security. Fuzzy key extraction from fingerprint
biometrics based on dynamic quantization mechanism (Manchester,
2007), pp. 71–76
57. A Arakala, J Jeffers, KJ Horadam, in ICB’07. Fuzzy extractors for
minutiae-based fingerprint authentication (Seoul, Korea, 2007),
pp. 760–769
58. P Tuyls, AHM Akkermans, TAM Kevenaar, GJ Schrijen, AM Bazen, RNJ
Veldhuis, in AVBPA. Practical biometric authentication with template
protection, (2005), pp. 436–446. doi:10.1007/11527923_45
59. X Boyen, in Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. CCS ’04. Reusable cryptographic fuzzy
extractors, (2004), pp. 82–91. doi:10.1145/1030083.1030096
Karabat et al. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing  (2015) 2015:71 Page 18 of 18
60. MG Qiming Li, E-C Chang, in Proceedings of IEEEWorkshop on Biometrics (In
Association with CVPR). Fuzzy extractors for asymmetric biometric
representation (Anchorage, AK, 2008)
61. F Kerschbaum, MJ Atallah, D M’Raïhi, JR Rice, in ICBA. Private fingerprint
verification without local storage (Hong Kong, China, 2004), pp. 387–394
62. RW Hamming, Error detecting and error correcting codes. Bell Syst.
Technical J. 29, 147–160 (1950)
63. MA Turk, AP Pentland, in Proc. IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition (CVPR). Face recognition using eigenfaces (Maui, HI,
1991), pp. 586–591
64. R Kulkarni, A Namboodiri, in Biometrics (ICB), 2013 International Conference
On. Secure hamming distance based biometric authentication (Madrid,
2013), pp. 1–6
65. D Boneh, E-J Goh, K Nissim, in Proceedings of the Second International
Conference on Theory of Cryptography. TCC’05. Evaluating 2-dnf formulas
on ciphertexts (Springer Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005), pp. 325–341
66. M Osadchy, B Pinkas, A Jarrous, B Moskovich, in Security and Privacy (SP),
2010 IEEE SymposiumOn. Scifi - a system for secure face identification
(Oakland, CA, USA, 2010), pp. 239–254
67. SD Rane, W Sun, A Vetro, in Image Processing (ICIP), 2009 16th IEEE
International Conference On. Secure distortion computation among
untrusting parties using homomorphic encryption (Cairo, 2009),
pp. 1485–1488
68. J Bringer, H Chabanne, A Patey, in Financial CryptographyWorkshops.
Shade: Secure hamming distance computation from oblivious transfer
(Okinawa, Japan, 2013), pp. 164–176
69. MS Kiraz, B Schoenmakers, J Villegas, in Information Security, 10th
International Conference, ISC 2007, Valparaíso, Chile, October 9-12, 2007,
Proceedings. Efficient committed oblivious transfer of bit strings, (2007),
pp. 130–144
70. T El Gamal, in Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in Cryptology. A
public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms, (1985), pp. 10–18. doi:10.1109/TIT.1985.1057074
71. P Paillier, D Pointcheval, in Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of
ASIACRYPT ’99. LNCS, ed. by K-Y Lam, E Okamoto, and C Xing. Efficient
public-key cryptosystems provably secure against active adversaries,
vol. 1716 (Springer Singapore, 1999), pp. 165–179
72. J Katz, M Yung, Threshold cryptosystems based on factoring. 2501,
192–205 (2002). doi:10.1007/3-540-36178-2_12
73. S Goldwasser, S Micali, Probabilistic encryption. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 28(2),
270–299 (1984)
74. R Cramer, I Damgård, JB Nielsen, in Proceedings of the International
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques:
Advances in Cryptology. EUROCRYPT ’01. Multiparty computation from
threshold homomorphic encryption, (2001), pp. 280–299.
doi:10.1007/3-540-44987-6_18
75. M Raginsky, S Lazebnik, in Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems. Locality-sensitive binary codes from shift-invariant kernels,
(2009), pp. 1509–1517. web.engr.illinois.edu
76. A Gionis, P Indyk, R Motwani, in VLDB’99, Proceedings of 25th International
Conference on Very Large Data Bases, September 7-10, 1999. Similarity
search in high dimensions via hashing (Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, 1999),
pp. 518–529
77. J Bringer, H Chabanne, B Kindarji, Identification with encrypted biometric
data. Secur. Commun. Netw. 4(5), 548–562 (2011)
78. MS Charikar, in Proceedings of the Thiry-fourth Annual ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing. STOC ’02. Similarity estimation techniques from
rounding algorithms (ACM New York, NY, USA, 2002), pp. 380–388
79. DCL Ngo, ATB Jin, A Goh, Biometric hash: high-confidence face
recognition. IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Techn. 16(6), 771–775 (2006)
80. O Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1. (Cambridge
University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2006)
81. A Miyamoto, N Homma, T Aoki, A Satoh, Systematic design of RSA
processors based on high-radix montgomery multipliers. IEEE Trans. VLSI
Syst. 19(7), 1136–1146 (2011)
82. Y Yang, Z Guan, H Sun, Z Chen, in Information Security Practice and
Experience. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ed. by J Lopez, Y Wum.
Accelerating RSA with fine-grained parallelism using GPU, vol. 9065
(Beijing, China, 2015), pp. 454–468
83. NK Ratha, JH Connell, RM Bolle, in Proc. 3rd AVBPA. An analysis of minutiae
matching strength (Halmstad, Sweden, 2001), pp. 223–228
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
